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Recent economic developments highlight Latin America’s vulnerability to economic
and financial turmoil that is triggered by events in distant corners of the globe.  The
Asian financial crisis that began in 1997 and the more recent Russian crisis have left the
region profoundly shaken, and living in fear of a full-scale collapse. This “contagion”
has occurred through a number of channels.  The collapse of Asian demand has
contributed to the recent slide in world commodity prices, cutting into the commodity-
dependent region’s export income, and undermining the public finances in a number of
countries.  The Russian devaluation has raised the spectre of sovereign default, making
investors around the globe more wary of increasing their cross-border exposure.  And
the financial crises in Asia and Russia have severely undermined balance sheets of
emerging-market investors, reducing their capacity to invest in the region, and forcing
them into fire sales of their Latin American investments.
In this paper we lay out the fiscal and financial policies that can help protect economies
from the kind of global financial turbulence the world is now experiencing.  Exchange
rate policies are discussed in a separate paper.
Domestic Policy Makes a Difference
The crisis in which Latin America is now embroiled is a global one. The economic and
financial strains that were generated by the Asian crisis that began last year, and that
have intensified with the more recent Russian collapse, have spread seemingly without
discrimination, leaving no region and indeed no major economy of the world
unscathed.   It seems not to matter whether the economic and financial fundamentals
are sound, as they are in most of Latin America, or unsound.  The economies of Latin
America do not suffer from the underlying weaknesses that brought down Thailand,
Korea, or Russia, and yet the entire region suffered a collapse in asset prices as
investors flee, and the international financial markets are essentially closed for all of the
region’s borrowers.  In light of this, it might well be asked - is there any real point in
discussing domestic policies other than, perhaps, those that seek to completely isolate
the economy from the vagaries of the international financial system?
Although sound domestic policies have not insulated Latin American economies from
the current international financial turmoil, it would be a mistake to conclude that
policies are utterly irrelevant.  Even if financial markets were completely
undiscriminating, treating well- and poorly-managed countries identically, the impact
of the financial disruption on the local economy will depend upon the domestic policy
regime.4
Furthermore, though they have seemed to act without discrimination during periods of
extreme turbulence or panic, financial markets do seem to discriminate between
countries on the basis of macroeconomic fundamentals once the panic begins to
subside.  There is some evidence for this in Figure 1, in which we plot the September
29 yield on countries’ long-term dollar debt (in most cases a global bond of roughly 30
years’ duration, where this was not available, a Brady bond) against an estimate of the
countries’ overall fiscal balance in 1998, measured as a share of GDP.
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We see a strong negative correlation between the fiscal balance, an imperfect but
relevant indicator of the strength of domestic policy fundamentals, and the bond yield.
The relationship suggests a significant payoff to sound fiscal policies; while a balanced
budget is associated with an international bond yield of about 12 percent, a deficit of
six percent of GDP is associated with a yield of over 16 percent.
None of this is to suggest that fundamentals such as the fiscal policy stance explain all,
or even most, of the contraction in international credit that now afflicts Latin America
as a whole.  After all, the region’s fiscal and other fundamentals were much the same
in, say, July of 1998 as they were in August and September. But, whereas asset prices
were relatively high and the markets were open for the region in July, bond yields
skyrocketed and the financial markets slammed shut for the region in August.
However, Figure 1 supports the idea that, as markets return to some semblance of
normality, countries with better economic fundamentals will be among the first to
return to the market, and will therefore be better placed to avoid major economic
disruption.
Three Objectives for Policy
There are a number of policy arenas in which policymakers must act and dozens of
decisions—some large and others small—that affect an economy’s vulnerability to
                                                       
1 Recently issued global bonds that mature in either 2026 or 2027 were used except for
Ecuador and Peru, for which only Brady bonds were available.  This may help explain
why yields for Ecuador and Peru were higher than would have been expected on the
basis of fiscal outcomes.5
crisis.  Each decision involves a different set of difficult analytical issues, and different
economic and political tradeoffs.  But despite these complications and heterogeneity,
we can organize our thoughts more effectively if we evaluate policy alternatives with
three broad policy objectives in mind: (i) Be solvent, (ii) Be liquid, and (iii) Inspire
confidence.  Often these imperatives involve no tradeoffs but are instead mutually
reinforcing. For example, fiscal reforms that reinforce the public sector’s solvency are
likely at the same time to inspire greater confidence about prospects for the economy.
However, in other contexts there may be difficult tradeoffs, as we shall discuss below.
1. Be solvent.  Of these imperatives, the first is the most fundamental.  If policies imply
insolvency orCin terms more appropriate for some contextsCare not sustainable, then
liquidity can do no more than postpone the inevitable.  And it goes almost without
saying that insolvency precludes confidence.  The important point here is that, in the
volatile economic and financial environment that faces Latin America, solvency has as
much to do with what might happen as what is expected to happen.  That is, in order
to protect an economy from financial contagion it is not enough to be solvent under
existing circumstances and those that are expected to prevail, it is also important to be
solvent under the more difficult circumstances that may very well be down the road if
the world financial system comes under unexpected stress.
2. Be liquid.  Solvency or ‘sustainability’ is essential, but it is not enough.  It cannot be
assumed that international financial markets will always be available for individuals,
businesses or countries that are solvent.  As is now on vivid display in every corner of
the globe, financial markets occasionally seize up and credit vanishes for reasons that
have nothing to do with borrowers’ actions or circumstances.  When this happens,
those borrowers who are reliant upon the normal operation of financial markets need
to have alternative ways to finance themselves if they are to avoid a disruptive
payments crisis.  They need sources of liquidity to ensure that they can roll over their
debt and finance their deficits during these temporary interruptions of access to
financial markets.
Coping with these liquidity shocks is a particularly important challenge for the
economies of Latin America, and should be a key consideration in all dimensions of
policymaking.  For various reasons, including most notably their vulnerability to
external shocks, public and private borrowers from the region are considered risky, and
only a few countries of the region have investment-grade ratings.  Because of
regulatory structures in the industrial countries, this leaves Latin American
borrowersCand borrowers in emerging market economies around the worldCreliant on
a relatively narrow range of potential investors, investors who are themselves highly
vulnerable to portfolio shocks in other regions of the world.  Thus, the losses inflicted
on emerging-market investors by Asia and Russia generated a firesale of Latin
American assets and an interruption of normal credit flows to the region, motivated not
by a fundamental reassessment of Latin American risk, but by the financial difficulties
that faced emerging-market investors in the North.  But, while not caused by fears
about the region’s stability, the interruption of credit carries with it the danger of
capsizing those economies without the sources of liquidity required to survive a
potentially prolonged period of global financial turbulence.6
3. Inspire confidence.  It is in almost all circumstances far easier to maintain a stable
macroeconomic and financial environment when there is confidence in the credibility of
the fiscal and monetary policy framework, and in the robustness of the domestic
financial system.  In fact, all economies are at least theoretically vulnerable to
confidence crises, if only because financial crises can so easily be self-fulfilling.  Even
the best-run bank would be brought down if depositors lost confidence in the
institution and ran.  Similarly, even sound and conservatively managed economies
would find themselves in a crisis if, for some reason, holders of the public debt lost
confidence in the government’s ability or willingness to repay and refused to roll it
over.
But confidence is essential in other less extreme but no less relevant circumstances.  It
is, for example, well understood that the inflationary costs of a move in the exchange
rate or other inflationary shocks depend upon the credibility of government promises
not to accommodate wage inflation.  To raise another example that will be discussed in
some detail below, we all understand that there are very good reasons to allow the
budget to move into deficit during recessions.  But financial markets will finance such
deficits only if market participants have confidence that when the recession disappears,
the government will be able to generate the fiscal surpluses that are required to service
the higher public debt.
What is required to inspire the confidence needed to maintain economic stability in a
volatile environment?  Certainly the solvency or sustainability of the current policy
stance, and sufficient liquidity to survive periods of international financial turbulence
are necessary conditions for such confidence.  But they may not be sufficient.  The
public needs to worry not only about current but also future policies, and in the
absence of the right institutional framework policymakers have no way to commit
themselvesCmuch less future policymakersCto a given course of action.  This means
that policy actions and institutional structures need to be established with an eye
toward inspiring confidence, as well as ensuring solvency and liquidity.
Arenas for Policy Action
These general objectives must guide action in two key arenas in which policymakers
must make decisions: fiscal policy and policies toward the financial system. This paper
will concentrate on the first two of these policy arenas, leaving exchange rate policy
for a separate discussion (see Hausmann, Gavin, Pages-Serra and Stein, 1999). While
this may exclude some relevant areas of policy, it allows us to cover most of the key
decisions, and to highlight the ways in which decisions may affect solvency, liquidity
and confidence.  In Table 1, we summarize the discussion that follows, highlighting the
solvency, liquidity and confidence problems that need to be addressed in each area, and
potential responses to those problems.
The Fisc
Although both the Tequila crisis of 1995 and the ongoing crisis in Asia demonstrate
that a responsible fiscal policy is no guarantee of economic stability, few would deny
that incautious fiscal policies increase vulnerability at least, and if carried too far, will
be an independent source of economic instability.  The most obvious problems arise7
from insolvency, when fiscal imbalances are large enough to generate doubts about the
public sector’s actual or prospective capacity to repay the debts implied by current and
anticipated future imbalances.  When these doubts become severe enough, financing
for the deficits vanishes and the government is forced into either a fiscal adjustment or
inflationary finance.
But this extreme situation of insolvency is not the only, or even the most important
challenge faced by Latin American governments, almost all of which have debts and
deficits that are manageable, and perceived to be so, in normal times.  Problems arise
during bad economic times, when the economy decelerates, fiscal revenues decline, and
a previously manageable deficit begins to grow.  It is widely understood that such an
increase in the fiscal deficit is stabilizing and desirable, as long as the bad times are
expected to be transitory.  And, if holders of the government’s debt had confidence
that these transitory deficits would be followed by surpluses sufficiently large to
service the implied debt, all would be well.  But this confidence is often lacking,
because policymakers cannot commit themselves (or future governments) to running
the requisite future surpluses.  The result: non-inflationary finance often vanishes just
when it is most needed, and governments are forced into high destabilizing fiscal
contractions just when a more stabilizing fiscal policy would be most valuable.
2  The
interaction of solvency and confidence problems thus generates a highly destabilizing
fiscal response to adverse economic shocks.
Liquidity concerns pose an additional challenge to fiscal policymaking.  No matter how
small the fiscal deficit, any government with an outstanding stock of debt needs to roll
its debt over as it matures.  The amount of debt that needs to be rolled is normally
large, in the sense that generating a fiscal surplus sufficient to redeem the debt as it
comes due would be economically and socially difficult and often politically impossible.
This renders even solvent governments highly reliant upon the normal operation of
financial markets.  But as we have seen, the financial markets upon which Latin
American governments must depend are not completely reliable, and have in recent
years suffered periodic breakdowns, during which Latin American governments’ access
to finance temporarily vanishes.  Unless governments of the region plan for these
episodes, they may find themselves forced to take highly disruptive, emergency fiscal
measures, and even these may be insufficient to generate the resources required to
redeem the debt that cannot be rolled over.
How can the region’s governments address these problems?  To promote solvency,
governments can do at least three things:
￿  Run very small deficits or precautionary fiscal surpluses during normal times.
These reduce the precariousness of the region’s access to credit by lowering, over
time, the public debt and thus improving over time the public sector’s perceived
capacity to run deficits during bad times.  More immediately, a precautionary fiscal
                                                       
2 Gavin, Hausmann, Perotti and Stein (1996) and Gavin and Perotti (1997) provide
evidence thatCin sharp contrast to the industrial economiesCfiscal policy has been
highly procyclical in Latin America, particularly during ‘bad times’ (roughly speaking,
recessions).8
surplus provides a fiscal ‘cushion’ so that the budget can absorb an adverse
economic shock without generating a deficit large enough to be perceived as
threatening.
3
￿  Because these surpluses are difficult to sustain in a competitive political
environment in which fiscal decision making is plagued by the well-known traps
associated with the process of social choice, it may be desirable to develop
appropriate rules for the conduct of fiscal policy.  The logical basis for such rules
is the same as the case for an independent central bank, or autonomous regulatory
authorities, and lies in the distortions inherent in the process of collective choice
about aggregate spending or borrowing decisions. These distortions imply that
outcomes can be systematically improved if participants in the decision-making
process agree ahead of time to bind themselves to a set of rules.
4  Simple balanced-
budget rules are highly inappropriate for the region, as they would essentially
legislate the pro-cyclicality that we seek to eliminate.  But rules that are expressed
in terms of fiscal balance that is adjusted for the “cycle,” or other economic factors
such as a key commodity price, may improve matters.
￿  Where the public finances are highly reliant upon certain key commodity prices,
governments can also develop well-designed fiscal stabilization funds, which
combine a fiscal rule for spending commodity-based income with an investment
policy for the excess of actual commodity-based revenue over that which is spent
in a given year.  Once it has accumulated a sufficiently large balance, the
stabilization fund not only promotes solvency, but also provides a stock of liquid
assets that may be used to address liquidity problems created by a temporary loss
of access to financial markets. Stabilization funds can also be complemented with
policies to use financial markets to insulate the budget from fluctuations in
commodity prices.  While financial markets as they now stand provide only limited
protection, this is no reason not to take advantage of the protection that they offer.
As we have noted, solvency is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition to prevent
crises.  Even solvent governments can experience liquidity problems, either because of
an unjustified (but self-fulfilling) panic, or because international financial markets
temporarily freeze up for reasons completely unrelated to the country involved.  This
means that, to decrease an economy’s vulnerability to financial shocks, governments
should concern themselves with liquidity, as well as solvency.  Potential responses to
this objective include:
￿  Avoid short-term debt.  Of course, this is easier said than done when economies
come under stress and the market for medium- and long-term public debt begins to
evaporate.  Under these conditions, there is a strong case for indexing or
                                                       
3Gavin and Perotti (1997) provide evidence that Latin American countries that entered
a period with a relatively small fiscal deficit tended to exhibit less pro-cycliclity than
countries that entered the period with relatively high deficits.
4 Eichengreen, Hausmann and von Hagen (1996) discuss in detail the distortions
inherent in collective decision making about fiscal policy, and explain why imposing
some constraints on the process may improve outcomes.9
dollarizing the public debt, if by doing so governments can issue longer term debt
and thus reduce rollover risk, and if the public sector is solvent.  If the public
sector is not solvent, then issuing indexed debt merely postpones the inevitable
adjustment, and will make the adjustment much more expensive if the resolution of
the unsustainable fiscal position involves, as it often does, a major move of the
exchange rate, prices and interest rates.
￿  Issue debt in advance of cash-flow needs, even if this means paying a significant
difference between the cost of borrowing and the return that can be earned on
deposits.  Insurance is never free, but the security that is provided when the public
sector’s cash flows are covered for several months, even if financial markets
vanish, may prove highly valuable.  This insurance policy is particularly crucial
around the time of elections, which have tended to be problematic periods for fiscal
policymakers, and in which uncertainty about the nature of the future government
may reduce fiscal policymakers’ access to financial markets.
￿  Seek contingent sources of credit.  Last year, the Mexican Government entered
into an agreement with 33 international banks that committed them to provide the
government with a total of roughly US$2.7 billion should the financial environment
deteriorate for Mexico.  Recently, the government drew upon that line of credit.
This was somewhat to the dismay of the banks involved, but the experience shows
that insurance policies against international liquidity crises can be purchased in the
market, at least in limited quantities.
Finally, fiscal policymakers need to inspire confidence.  Achieving solvency and
ensuring adequate liquidity will obviously go a long way here, but they may not be
enough, because investors need to be confident not only that the current fiscal stance is
adequate, but also that future fiscal policies will be adequate to service the debt the
government is trying to issue.  It is difficult for governments to create this confidence,
if only because they cannot commit the actions of future governments.  Thus, to
increase confidence in fiscal stance, it may be desirable to:
￿  Implement institutional reforms to buttress confidence in fiscal management over
the medium term.  Fiscal rules are one way to do this.  But confidence can also be
created through reforms of the budgetary process that provide for greater
transparency, and ensure that the budgetary debate will not be skewed by unclear
or flawed assumptions, or by misleading fiscal accounting.  Policymakers could
think about going further, and creating an autonomous scorekeeping institution
with responsibility for ensuring adequate fiscal accounting, forecasting fiscal
developments under alternative policy assumptions, and perhaps for making
recommendations about the appropriate fiscal stance.
The Banks
It is only a slight overstatement to say that, during the 1990s, the conventional wisdom
shifted from “It’s mostly fiscal” to “It’s mostly financial.”  We have learned that fragile
banking systems can act as powerful amplifiers of external shocks.  And because
domestic banks are an important interface between the international financial system10
and the domestic economy, the banking system is particularly exposed to international
financial turbulence.
When the banking system is fragile, an economic or financial shock can lead to a loss
of confidence in the system’s stability, which can generate a disruptive flight from the
banking system.  A robust banking system is thus built upon the same three pillars:
solvency, liquidity, and confidence.  Policy choices are somewhat more complex than
in the case of fiscal policy, because policymakers’ influence over these is more indirect.
There is, nonetheless, much that can be done.
Solvency of the banking system is a concern because the volatile macroeconomic
environment in which Latin American banks must operate creates major shocks to the
profitability of banks’ borrowers, and therefore the quality of the banks’ portfolio.
Here it is worth noting that banks do not benefit when their borrowers experience a
positive shock, because for the most part they make loan rather than equity
investments but banks do lose when their borrowers experience an adverse shock large
enough to result in default.  However, solvency can also be threatened by good times,
such as when a surge of capital inflows is intermediated by the banks, creating a
lending boom that results in impaired balance sheets and a vulnerable financial system.
5
Finally, ensuring that banks remain solvent is more difficult in Latin America because
supervisors must work with a weaker information base, and the scarcity of relevant
skills undermines the effectiveness of bank supervision and regulation.  What can be
done to ensure that banks are solvent, and will remain solvent even after the economy
is hit by a significant shock?  Governments can:
￿  Counteract bank lending booms by ‘leaning against the wind’ with countercyclical
liquidity requirements.
￿  Impose significantly higher capital adequacy ratios than may be appropriate for
banks located in less volatile environments.  The 8 percent capital adequacy ratio
that was enshrined in the Basel accord was designed for major, internationally
active banks operating in industrial economies.  Banks operating in highly volatile
environments like Latin America need more capital; luckily this is being recognized
in many countries of the region, such as Argentina where the requirement of 11
percent is more attuned to the economic and financial environment in which the
country’s banks must operate.
￿  Institute mechanisms to promote market discipline of domestic banks.  Market
discipline is no cure-all, but in an environment that is relatively information-poor, it
is particularly useful to complement official supervision with the efforts of informed
investors who have a financial stake in the soundness of the bank.  In this regard,
the requirement that a significant portion of a domestic bank’s capital base be in
the form of subordinated debt is particularly noteworthy. This structure creates a
set of informed investors who have an incentive to monitor the behavior of the
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major banking crisis in Latin America and the industrial countries, and provide reasons
to believe that the lending boom contributed to the subsequent crisis.11
banks in which they are investing, thus complementing the efforts of the official
regulatory apparatus.
￿  Internationalize the domestic banking system.  Banking firms are national not
because national borders define natural market limits, but simply because bank
charters are granted by national authorities, so that they can regulate the activities
that take place within the country’s borders.  Internationally active banks promote
robustness because they are diversified geographically, which makes them less
vulnerable to country-specific macroeconomic and financial shocks.  When they are
hit by such a shock, local branches or subsidiaries of major international banks have
access to the parent company’s stock of capital.  Furthermore, international banks
from well-supervised financial systems with well-functioning capital markets bring
with them the supervisory efforts of the world’s most effective regulators, and the
market discipline imposed by the world’s most demanding capital markets.
6
But solvency is not sufficient to protect the domestic financial system, for banks are
preeminently vulnerable to liquidity crises, generated by runs by the bank’s depositors,
or by reserve outflows associated with an interruption of international capital flows
during a temporary breakdown of the international financial system.  Liquidity
shortages caused by these events may force banks abruptly and unexpectedly to
contract credit, putting both their borrowers and the economy under strain, and
eventually undermining the stability of the financial system.
In the relatively tranquil economic and financial environment of the industrial
countries, where official safety nets are relatively broad and strong, these runs have
become a subject of interest mainly to economic historians, and if bank reserve or
liquidity requirements are thought of at all, they are considered mainly as tools to
improve monetary control.   But in the more volatile Latin American context, the risks
of systemic illiquidity in the banking system are much more real, and are far more
difficult to handle. In the event of a run on the banking system, depositors are likely to
flee into a foreign currency, which the authority cannot print, rather than the domestic
currency that it can.
How can authorities minimize the risks of systemic illiquidity in the banking system?
They can:
￿  Build bank liquidity requirements as an essential element of the prudential
regulatory framework, whether they are needed for purposes of monetary control
or not.  Where the volatility of the demand for bank deposits is high, liquidity
requirements should also be high. And to prevent these requirements from
unnecessarily raising the cost of credit, they should be remunerated.  A substantial
portion of the reserves should be in the form of liquid foreign currency assets that
can satisfy the sudden demand for international liquidity in the event of a shock.
￿  Discourage intermediation of short-term capital inflows by requiring that banks
hold substantial reserves against all of their short-term liabilities, foreign and
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domestic.  If international deposits are more volatile than domestic, they should
attract higher reserve requirements.
￿  Encourage the development of international standby credit facilities. Although
there is no true international lender of last resort, the banking system can protect
itself from the danger of systemic liquidity crises by entering into contracts with
private international lenders that provide a source of contingent credit in the event
of a liquidity crisis in the domestic banking system. Argentina  has created a
Contingent Repo Program, which gives the Central Bank the right to obtain short-
term credit from a collection of 13 international banks in the event of a liquidity
crisis such as the one that hit the country in 1995. It is an innovative example of
ways in which markets can be utilized to protect the financial system from liquidity
shocks.  Such programs need not be limited to the Central Bank, but could also be
extended to domestic banking institutions.
Finally, the domestic banking system needs to inspire confidence.  Solvency and
liquidity are essential elements, but they may not be enough, for even the most
prudently run bank could be brought down by a bank-run.  To promote confidence in
domestic banks, governments can also:
￿  Promote transparency by setting high standards for bank disclosure and working
with the private sector to improve accounting standards.
￿  Create adequate safety nets so that small depositors will be relieved of worries
about the safety of their deposits, and will therefore be less reluctant to flee on the
basis of vague anxieties or wild rumors.  Certainly such safety nets create potential
problems of moral hazard, which must be controlled through the prudential
regulatory and supervisory framework. But, in our view, the costs of such moral
hazard are easily overstated, and are almost certainly very small by comparison
with the costs of a bank-run that could have been prevented.13
Table 1
Overview of Policies to Promote Economic and Financial Stability
Be solvent Be liquid Inspire confidence
The fisc Problem:  Precarious access
to noninflationary sources of
financing creates the need
for a large and destabilizing




in good times.  Introduce
fiscal rules or stabilization
mechanisms to cope with
large fiscal shocks.
Problem: Need to refinance
existing debt stock creates
‘rollover risk’ if financial
markets disappear.
Response: Issue debt well in
anticipation of cash-flow
needs, especially around the
time of elections.  Avoid
short-term debt.  If necessary
to extend the maturity of the
debt, and if the public sector
is solvent, issue indexed
debt.
Problem: Inability to
credibly commit to future
surplus undermines
confidence in medium-term





credibility of medium term
fiscal management.
The banks Problem: A volatile
macroeconomic environment
poses major threats to bank
solvency.  Large capital
inflows may generate bank
lending booms that lead to
impaired balance sheets and
a vulnerable financial
system.  A weak information
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requirements for banks, held
in the form of foreign-
















Promote transparency in the
domestic banking system.